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When to show confidence? 
The interaction between CEO overconfidence and conveyed confidence in M&A 
announcements 
Abstract  
In this paper, we investigate the moderating effect of conveyed confidence on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and acquirer stock returns. Drawing on signaling theory as our 
theoretical lens, we argue that CEO overconfidence influences deal performance. Relying on 
the behavioral literature on CEO overconfidence we hypothesize that acquisitions helmed by 
overconfident acquirer CEOs yield negative acquirer stock returns upon announcement and 
that the level of conveyed confidence can dampen this effect. Based on original data that 
incorporates the financial data of the firms, their stock performance, and collect press releases 
for the focal deals, we test our hypothesis using a sample of mergers and acquisitions of 
public targets conducted by constituents of the S&P 500 from 2014 until 2020. Contrary to 
our baseline hypothesis, we do not find a negative relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and the acquirer stock returns. However, lower levels of conveyed confidence in the acquirer 
announcement communication lead to a significantly more positive stock return for 
overconfident acquirer CEOs. Our findings advance the literature on M&A announcements by 
looking into the level of conveyed confidence that is disseminated through the M&A 
announcement press releases as we address how individual factors and M&A communication 
work together to influence investors.  
Keywords: Acquisitions; CEO overconfidence; Signaling Theory;  Event Study; 
1. Introduction  
We're confident that, once regulators see the compelling benefits, they'll agree this is the right 
move at the right time for consumers and the country. April 29, 2018, joint press release for 
the T-Mobile-Sprint acquisition announcement retrieved from LexisNexis.   
 
CEOs helming the next acquisition are commonly expected to convey confidence in 
the outcome of their recent strategic decision to pair up with others for the future. 
Overconfidence refers to a cognitive bias of substantial scholarly interest (Chen, Crossland, & 
Luo, 2015; Lee, Hwang, & Chen, 2017) and a widely observed phenomenon in human 
decision-making and M&A research at large (Lee et al., 2017; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). 
CEOs, as frequent decision-makers, are often prone to this bias (Heaton, 2002; Navis & 
Ozbek, 2016) and research on the influence of CEO overconfidence on firm performance 
outcomes has yielded mixed results (Chen et al., 2015; Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Malmendier 
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& Tate, 2008; Navis & Ozbek, 2016). However, in the context of mergers and acquisitions 
(hereafter: M&A), the acquirer CEO’s level of overconfidence is associated with negative 
short-term stock market reactions upon M&A announcement (Malmendier & Tate, 2008). On 
the other hand, deal-specific confidence, meaning the confidence of a CEO to generate value 
with a specific deal, represents a positive signal to investors (Gamache et al., 2018; Schijven 
& Hitt, 2012). Hence, the question arises how investors react to combinations of signals of 
CEO overconfidence and deal-specific confidence? Therefore, we investigated the moderating 
effect of conveyed confidence in the M&A announcement communication on the relationship 
between CEO overconfidence and acquirer announcement stock returns.  
We draw on a behavioral conceptualization of investors and regard stock market 
reactions as an indicator for the overall investor sentiment triggered by the release of new 
information (Campbell, Sirmon, & Schijven, 2016; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Both signaling 
theory and impression management offer powerful theoretical lenses to study the effects of 
disseminated information on investors’ reactions to M&A announcements (Campbell et al., 
2016; Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016). In this paper, we draw on signaling theory and 
follow Vergne, Wernicke, and Brenner (2018: 811) who argue that “it may be more realistic 
to examine the drivers of signal credibility [hence, the relationship between signal and 
underlying quality (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011)] from the viewpoint of signal 
interpreters”. This is especially interesting since scholars have begun assessing the effect of 
signal interaction, and in particular signal incongruence (Paruchuri, Han, & Prakash, 2020; 
Stern, Dukerich, & Zajac, 2014). While the aforementioned papers show the overall negative 
effects of signal incongruence, we set out to investigate a case in which signal incongruence 
might yield positive outcomes. While acquirer CEO overconfidence represents a negative 
signal to investors in M&A announcements, because of its increased likelihood to destroy 
value (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986), deal-specific conveyed confidence represents a 
positive signal, indicating value creation (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Our results indicate that 
lower levels of conveyed confidence are more positive in the case of higher levels of CEO 
overconfidence, showing that signal incongruence can yield positive effects for the acquirer 
announcement stock returns.  
Following previous literature, we define CEO overconfidence as an acquired cognitive 
bias that fosters a CEO’s belief to possess superior capabilities in deriving value from M&A 
deals. One key aspect of CEO overconfidence is its nature as a cognitive bias rather than an 
inter-individual disposition. Hence, overconfidence is acquired by a CEO rather than a 
manifestation of his or her personality (Billett & Qian, 2008). Therefore, the recent 
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experience of a CEO is likely to influence the level of overconfidence he or she possesses, 
which in turn influences the decision-making process (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
Regarding the deal-specific confidence, we draw on linguistic measures recently used in both 
management and finance to assess the level of conveyed confidence in documents (Lee et al., 
2017; Loughran & McDonald, 2011). We analyzed the acquirer M&A announcement press 
releases to conduct this measure since press releases represent a medium that is widely 
followed by investors (Dyck & Zingales, 2003).  
 Our contributions to the literature are threefold. Firstly, indicators of the level of CEO 
confidence in the value-creating potential of an M&A event were found to influence 
investors’ reactions upon M&A announcement (Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Schijven & Hitt, 
2012). However, there is an ongoing debate to further shed light on the conditions influencing 
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm performance outcomes (Reyes, 
Vassolo, Kausel, Torres, & Zhang, 2020). We add to this by investigating how the conveyed 
confidence in the M&A announcement communication influences the aforementioned 
relationship, thereby, extending the literature on signal interaction and signal incongruence in 
particular.  Secondly, research on M&A announcement effects has started to look into the 
influence of acquirer communication prior to and around M&A announcements. For instance, 
Graffin, Haleblian, and Kiley (2016) found that acquirers are more likely to disclose a higher 
frequency of positive yet deal-unrelated press releases prior to an M&A announcement that is 
anticipated to yield negative investor response. However, this research has not yet looked into 
the effects of the M&A announcement communication itself (Gao, Yu, & Cannella Jr, 2016). 
We aim to advance the literature here by looking into the level of conveyed confidence that is 
disseminated through the M&A announcement press releases. Thirdly, research drawing on 
behavioral theory has found various links between individual-level factors and M&A 
outcomes (Devers et al., 2020; Welch, Pavićević, Keil, & Laamanen, 2019). However, the 
M&A communication strategy has paid less attention to how individual factors and M&A 
communication work together to influence investors (de Groote et al., 2019; Devers et al., 
2020).  
2 Hypotheses  
2.1 CEO overconfidence and its influence on M&A short-term stock market responses   
Overconfidence represents a cognitive bias referring to a mismatch between perceived 
and reasonable levels of confidence (Moore & Healy, 2008). It leads individuals to have an 
unrealistic belief in their performance and predictions. Here, we look into the influence of 
CEO overconfidence, defined as an acquired cognitive bias that fosters a CEO’s belief to 
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possess superior capabilities in deriving value from M&A deals (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; 
Roll, 1986). Following, this line of research we expect to also find a negative relationship 
between higher levels of CEO overconfidence and investors’ reaction to M&A 
announcements.  
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of CEO overconfidence is associated with lower levels of short-
term acquirer stock returns upon M&A announcement.  
2.2 The conveyed confidence in firm disclosures – the influence of textual tone  
While traditional signaling theory regards language-based signals as unreliable 
because senders face equal costs producing them (Bergh, Connelly, Ketchen Jr, & Shannon, 
2014), this assumption is based on isolated substantive signals (Connelly et al., 2011). 
However, if analyzing multiple signals and their interactions, language has been found to 
influence the uptake of substantive signals (i.e. signals with a separating cost function) 
(Steigenberger & Wilhelm, 2018). One key aspect of language that was found to influence 
investors is the textual tone (Hossain, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2020; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 
2014; Price, Doran, Peterson, & Bliss, 2012). In management science, the textual tone of 
documents was found to be associated with the level of confidence (Lee et al., 2017). 
Thereby, the level of conveyed confidence could influence the more substantive signal of 
CEO overconfidence by mitigating its negative effects. 
Hypothesis 2: Lower levels of conveyed confidence in a firm’s M&A announcement 
communication positively moderate the relationship between CEO overconfidence and short-
term acquirer stock returns upon M&A announcement. 
3 Methods  
3.1 Sample 
The opportunity to establish the empirical value of the above arguments is tested using 
Thomson SDC to build our acquisition sample. The initial population encompasses all 
mergers and acquisitions of public targets undertook by constituents of the S&P 500 as of 
December 31, 2020. We refine this to include all M&As announced: (1) between January 1, 
2014, and December 31, 2020; (2) which do not involve a recapitalization, repurchase of own 
shares, or a spin-off to existing shareholders; (3) in which the acquirer was seeking to buy 
100% of the target shares at the announcement. This selection leaves us with a sample size of 
n = 158 deals, for which we calculated our variables. Our dataset is composed using different 





To test our hypotheses, we estimated four robust ordinary least square (OLS) models. 
In all cases, we control for unobserved effects by including year dummies, and we correct for 
industry clusters using the acquirer SIC code to create major industry group dummy variables.   
Dependent variable 
Acquirer abnormal short-term stock market returns. We operationalized the investors’ 
reaction using the conventional event study measure of short-term cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). Event studies using CARs are very common in acquisition research (Haleblian, 
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). They represent a good measure for gauging 
the overall market sentiment change as a consequence of the dissemination of new information 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). In this paper, the CARs are calculated using a ten-day trading 
window, previously used in CEO overconfidence studies (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  
Independent Variables  
Level of CEO overconfidence. Following the literature on CEO overconfidence, we 
measured the level of CEO overconfidence, as the stock appreciation during the twelve-month 
prior to an M&A announcement, excluding the period in which we gathered our dependent 
variable (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Level of conveyed confidence. We built our measures 
of conveyed confidence based on the textual tone of firm communication in the acquisition 
announcement. More specifically, we analyzed the content of press releases using an automated 
linguistic approach that exploits dictionaries particularly developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) for the analysis of financial text bodies. Firstly, we counted the number of 
negative words in a given document and standardized it by the total number of words in a 
document. This approach has recently been used to assess the level of confidence in various 
text bodies (e.g. Twitter account,  earnings conference calls transcripts) (Lee et al., 2017). 
Secondly, we conducted a measure to be used in the robustness check. Following Huang et al. 
(2014) we calculated the textual tone of a document taking the difference between negative and 
positive words, and dividing it by the total number of words in a document (Hossain et al., 
2020).  
Main findings and contributions  
Our results indicate that the influence of CEO overconfidence on the acquirer stock 
returns is moderated by the level of conveyed confidence in the M&A announcement 
communication. Hence, these two signals interact to influence investors. Moreover, lower 
levels of conveyed confidence (a positive signal of CEO deal-specific confidence) are more 
beneficial in the case of higher levels of CEO overconfidence. Therefore, we find interesting 
results of how signal incongruence can yield positive effects (Paruchuri et al., 2020; Vergne et 
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al., 2018). Moreover, while outside of the scope of our study, we find that conveyed 
confidence is explaining a substantive part of the acquirer stock returns, which is showing 
initial evidence for the effectiveness of language-based signals in M&A announcements 
(Steigenberger & Wilhelm, 2018). Interestingly, we find a positive influence of CEO 
overconfidence on the acquirer stock return in contrast to previous literature (Hayward & 
Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). However, future research might profit from 
implementing additional measures of CEO overconfidence.  
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Table 2. Multiple regression (dummies for year and industry not reported). Dependent variable: acquirer's cumulative 
abnormal returns 
 DV: acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (-5,5) 
 H1 H2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Acquisition premium (1 Week prior) -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Acquirer performance 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Acquirer debt-to-equity -0.099 -0.053 -0.109 -0.094 
 (0.236) (0.226) (0.224) (0.207) 
Geographic proximity -0.823 -0.790 -0.823 -0.900 
 (0.681) (0.650) (0.642) (0.592) 
Number of competing bidders -0.038 0.055 0.513 0.601 
 (1.263) (1.205) (1.210) (1.115) 
Industry similarity -0.034 0.101 0.056 -0.030 
 (0.436) (0.418) (0.413) (0.381) 
Merger of equals -1.930 -2.683 -2.542 -1.665 
 (3.357) (3.210) (3.170) (2.927) 
Defense tactics 0.092 0.228 -0.207 -0.497 
 (4.641) (4.428) (4.377) (4.034) 
 (1.376) (1.317) (1.313) (1.211) 
CEO overconfidence  0.047*** 0.048*** 0.022* 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Conveyed confidence   -195.741** -207.600** 
   (92.848) (85.606) 
CEO overconfidence* Conveyed confidence    -12.723*** 
    (2.585) 
Constant 0.875 1.657 2.333 2.035 
 (1.602) (1.543) (1.557) (1.436) 
 
Observations 158 158 158 158 
R2 0.130 0.214 0.239 0.359 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 0.089 0.112 0.245 
Residual Std. Error 4.268 (df = 133) 4.072 (df = 132) 4.020 (df = 131) 3.705 (df = 130) 
F Statistic 0.992 (df = 20; 133) 1.707** (df = 21; 132) 1.874** (df = 22; 131) 3.164*** (df = 23; 130) 
 
Note: 












Figure 1. Estimated interaction effect 
